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ABSTRACT: For the last years, Europe has been subject to fiscal austerity in order to 
satisfy the Maastrich criteria. In this way, Spanish municipalities have been affected by 
new regulations and local government structure has changed. This paper is focused on 
the main factors that explain local government debt. In particular, budgetary 
information of a group of Spanish municipalities is used (1990-2000). Econometric 
analysis of cross section and panel data are presented 
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Clasificación JEL: I1, H71, H51, H72 1.  Introduction. 
 
After the approval of Spanish Constitution in 1978, Local Administrations and in 
particular  Spanish municipalities have been affected by new regulations which 
influence government  expenditure and public revenue.  At this moment, one of the 
problems of Local Corporations comes from the different financing reforms ( Law 
51/2002, of December 27,  Law 39/1988, of December 28), and the impact  of the 
18/2001 General Budgetary Stability Law and the development of the “Local Pact”.   
 
The objective of this paper is to study the main socioeconomic, political and 
budgetary factors that motivate local government debt. In particular, the main factors 
that affect local government debt are analyzed. For this purpose budgetary information 
of a group of Spanish municipalities, for which we have information from 1992 to 1999, 
is used. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a survey of the main 
studies related with  local government debt. Next, we propose an econometric model 
based on panel data. After a detailed description of the sample, as well as the main 
variables used, the results are presented in Section 3. Last section summarizes some 
concluding remarks.   
 
2.  Recent Literature about local government debt. 
 
The diverse justifications in the Theory of the Fiscal Federalism to establish 
limitations to local government debt are based on three types of considerations: 
Intergenerational justness, budgeting stability and limitations of debt as mechanism of 
fiscal illusion (Bosch and Suárez Pandiello, 1994).  
 
In this way, there are different studies focused on modelling local government 
debt  (Ezquiaga, 1996; Arnau, 1997; Espina, 1997, Brusca and Labrador, 1998; 
Escudero and Prior, 2002 and 2003; Cabasés et al., 2003) although most of them are 
focused on autonomous communitites (Monasterio and Suárez Pandiello, 1993 y 1996; 
García-Milá and McGuire, 1993; García-Milá et al., 1999; Monasterio, et al., 1999; 
Benito et al., 2001; López Laborda and Vallés, 2002; Alcalde and Vallés, 2002; Vallés, 1999 y 2002; Álvarez and Salinas, 2002 y 2003). In Escudero and Prior (2002) the local 
government debt and its control in 1995 and 1996 are analysed. Their results confirm 
that decentralized local governments have higher levels of consolidated debt. Also, in 
Escudero and Prior (2003), the effects of political cycles are studied for the period 1998 
to 1999. Their results show that the year previous elections, local spending is higher. 
Other empirical studies are González-Páramo (1995), Férnandez (2003), Cabases et al. 
(2003), Heins (1963), Mitchell (1967), M cEachern (1978), Epple and Spatt (1986), 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994 and 1995), Dafflon (1996), Bennet and Dilorenzo 
(1982), Blewet (1984), Bunch (1991), Von Hagen (1991) Farnharm (1985), Pogue 
(1970) Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996), Joulfaian and Marlow (1989) and Merrifield 
(1994). However, it is not clear which variables explain local government debt.  
 
3.  The model. 
 
In this part of the paper, we will focus on the factors that could explain Spanish 
local government debt. We will explain local government debt, D, according to this 
model: 
 
D = D(E, P, F)          (1) 
 
where E is a set of socioeconomic variables, P is a set of political variables and F are 
some variables related to financial structure of local government. These variables are 
defined in TABLE 1. 
 TABLE 1 
Variables  
VECTOR  VARIABLES  DEFINITION  FORMALIZATION 
D  DPC  Net Variation of passive financial 
Chapter IX Revenues minus Chapter IX 
Expenditures 
Y  Income (of each municipality)  Net Income  
E 
GRAN  Dummy for Big Cities 
1 for Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, 
Zaragoza, Sevilla and Málaga; 0 otherwise 
P  CIC  Dummy for local electoral cycle 
1 if the year is previous to local elections; 0 
otherwise 
  TEND  Trend  Trend 1992=1, 1993=2, ... 
INV  Real Investments  Chapter VI Expenditures 
AHB  Gross Savings  Current Revenues –  Current Expenditures 
PA_OR  Payments / Obligations   Payments / Obligations 
F 




All the monetary variables have been divided by local population of each year. 
We have considered as dependent variable the level of local debt, measured through the 
net variation of passive financial (DPC).  Apart from the independent variables, we 
should clarify other questions that do not appear reflected in the previous table. In this 
way, we have defined a dummy variable (GRAN) which takes the value one for these 
municipalities with population higher than 500.000 inhabitants. Also, we have included 
another variable (CIC) in order to test the electoral cycle hypothesis. That is, the year 
prior elections, politicians prefer to increase credit instead of increasing personal 
income tax. Finally, we have included investment and gross saving. TABLE 2 presents 





 TABLE 2 
Summary statistics 
 
1992  DPC  INV AHB  CFP COMP 
Mean  48.56  26.67 18.31  119.02 0.53 
Medium  29.14  20.78 24.32  112.23 0.52 
Std. Dev.  58.30  23.26 30.87  42.43 0.11 
V.C.  1.20  0.87 1.69  0.36 0.21 
Range  326.83  151.55 147.30  270.90 0.50 
1993  DPC  INV AHB  CFP COMP 
Mean  37.82  28.27 22.20  122.14 0.53 
Medium  22.36  23.06 23.02  115.18 0.52 
Std. Dev.  43.46  19.58 33.76  43.37 0.10 
V.C.  1.15  0.69 1.52  0.36 0.19 
Range  193.49  88.61 211.04  261.53 0.44 
1994  DPC  INV AHB  CFP COMP 
Mean  49.46  29.12 32.7  126.2 0.50 
Medium  29.68  23.06 29.39  117.1 0.50 
Std. Dev.  52.8  23.64 34.45  46.46 0.12 
V.C.  1.07  0.81 1.05  0.37 0.24 
Range  191.98  121.29 279.91  292.31 0.51 
1995  DPC  INV AHB  CFP COMP 
Mean  36.87  29.07 36.67  130.33 0.52 
Medium  25.45  26.81 32.84  121.67 0.52 
Std. Dev.  46.16  20.37 33.48  46.2 0.11 
V.C.  1.25  0.70 0.91  0.35 0.21 
Range  281.66  99.74 232.06  288.54 0.53 
Source: Own Elaboration. 
 
 TABLE 2 (continuation) 
Summary statistics 
 
1996  DPC  INV  AHB  CFP  COMP 
Mean  44.05  25.82  38.57  138.56  0.51 
Medium  26.03  21.16  37.67  131.15  0.51 
Std. Dev.  53.83  17.94  29.49  45.04  0.11 
V.C.  1.22  0.69  0.76  0.33  0.22 
Range  274.66  82.06  226.31  291.78  0.57 
1997  DPC  INV  AHB  CFP  COMP 
Mean  55.77  31.2  52.71  150.44  0.47 
Medium  33.92  27.58  49.96  139.38  0.47 
Std. Dev.  74.07  20.04  36.72  52.87  0.11 
V.C.  1.33  0.64  0.70  0.35  0.22 
Range  479.59  113.93  236.83  357.19  0.47 
1998  DPC  INV  AHB  CFP  COMP 
Mean  30.73  45.17  58.25  159.47  0.46 
Medium  18.57  39.85  57.5  146.48  0.46 
Std. Dev.  37.05  26.09  34.2  56.59  0.10 
V.C.  1.21  0.58  0.59  0.35  0.21 
Range  217.15  151.67  247.59  402.02  0.54 
1999  DPC  INV  AHB  CFP  COMP 
Mean  22.75  56.54  65.46  166.67  0.44 
Medium  16.29  48.94  63.29  157.96  0.44 
Std. Dev.  27.56  39.98  33.25  55.39  0.09 
V.C.  1.21  0.71  0.51  0.33  0.21 
Range  163.47  313.71  234.73  382.75  0.54 
Source: Own Elaboration. 
 
From previous results, it is deduced that the variable net per capita local debt  
(DPC) has experienced during the last years continuous variations although the relative 
dispersion  has been stabilized in the nineties.  We  have to  point out that  we are 
considering Spanish local governments of medium and big size in terms of population 
(but at the same time very different), for which there is available information since 1992 
to 1999. Also, real investments, INV (Chapter VI Expenditure) in 1999 doubles its value 
with respect to 1992. On the other hand, Gross Savings (AHB) increase gradually in 
most of the considered local governments. 
  
Finally, TABLE 3 shows summary statistics for the municipalities clasiffied by 
population.  TABLE 3 
Summary statistics considering municipalies’ population 
 
Less than 75000 inhabitants 
  DPC  INV  AHB  COMP 
  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range 
1992  43,19  38,22  0,72  97,98  31,99  24,59  0,71  78,34  4,03  13,90  8,32  118,91  0,54  0,53  0,21  0,42 
1993  34,37  20,32  0,92  93,37  33,62  23,24  0,77  0,77  10,99  11,83  3,76  178,62  0,55  0,58  0,17  0,38 
1994  28,68  28,68  0,92  91,65  30,77  22,77  0,93  0,93  0,93  24,25  1,42  164,53  0,52  0,54  0,23  0,46 
1995  26,72  24,23  0,76  84,09  35,09  33,41  0,77  94,30  21,68  25,64  1,59  149,51  0,54  0,55  0,22  0,53 
1996  31,15  20,50  0,82  98,99  31,33  27,69  0,65  79,22  28,16  31,23  1,05  144,11  0,55  0,56  0,21  0,48 
1997  21,61  14,71  0,88  61,79  37,25  29,75  0,70  97,12  36,84  35,23  0,85  121,92  0,51  0,49  0,21  0,41 
1998  30,73  33,17  0,83  97,85  37,25  33,76  0,62  78,23  41,49  42,65  0,67  126,97  0,49  0,49  0,21  0,44 
1999  28,55  25,74  0,83  84,73  43,11  43,20  0,56  87,35  45,23  44,70  0,60  90,74  0,44  0,44  0,22  0,53 
75000-200000 inhabitants 
  DPC  INV  AHB  COMP 
  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range 
1992  31,93  27,25  0,77  82,21  40,90  35,01  0,64  97,36  19,70  28,37  2,09  161,57  0,53  0,52  0,22  0,47 
1993  34,88  22,19  0,87  99,14  37,87  30,92  0,63  96,15  25,17  26,33  1,11  132,14  0,52  0,51  0,51  0,41 
1994  37,67  27,11  0,72  97,92  39,13  38,63  0,57  93,76  28,01  24,65  1,06  141,97  0,50  0,50  0,22  0,44 
1995  30,09  26,66  0,83  80,68  31,91  28,04  0,61  98,41  30,78  32,17  1,08  166,07  0,52  0,51  0,51  0,49 
1996  22,95  15,65  1,04  94,31  32,55  22,83  0,72  93,91  39,12  39,46  0,83  154,45  0,50  0,50  0,22  0,47 
1997  32,85  25,09  0,86  94,30  31,59  31,74  0,71  89,67  46,58  41,06  0,54  115,96  0,46  0,47  0,20  0,38 
1998  27,38  17,90  0,95  96,15  41,95  40,58  0,56  95,06  38,73  33,90  0,74  92,19  0,45  0,46  0,20  0,41 
1999  24,74  22,99  0,93  84,02  42,22  45,52  45,52  81,73  40,36  41,81  0,73  119,03  0,45  0,45  0,19  0,35 







 TABLE 3 (continuation) 
Summary statistics considering municipalies’ population 
 
200000-500000 inhabitants 
  DPC  INV  AHB  COMP 
  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range 
1992  36,15  43,40  0,72  74,54  23,50  23,81  0,48  40,70  32,27  35,83  0,66  70,43  0,53  0,50  0,17  0,35 
1993  40,20  32,03  0,63  66,97  27,68  26,73  0,43  40,79  42,39  43,42  0,61  95,63  0,51  0,51  0,16  0,31 
1994  29,80  18,55  0,93  85,60  40,18  33,61  0,61  79,62  43,05  37,78  0,56  89,36  0,46  0,44  0,30  0,63 
1995  29,80  26,96  0,85  82,22  36,69  36,06  0,61  82,77  44,16  50,19  0,49  75,67  0,49  0,47  0,22  0,42 
1996  34,25  25,12  0,75  98,53  39,98  35,55  0,58  70,43  44,22  40,94  0,45  67,71  0,44  0,43  0,22  0,34 
1997  23,42  16,35  1,13  87,84  33,60  25,09  0,73  91,52  49,60  56,84  0,50  81,34  0,43  0,42  0,26  0,38 
1998  23,42  22,13  0,91  57,85  35,81  31,24  0,73  89,51  54,22  57,78  0,51  83,39  0,42  0,44  0,18  0,27 
1999  28,81  22,04  0,88  94,96  28,32  25,13  0,71  79,82  51,59  57,95  0,58  95,86  0,39  0,41  0,24  0,33 
Over 500000 inhabitants 
  DPC  INV  AHB  COMP 
  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range  Mean  Medium  VC  Range 
1992  12,96  13,99  0,49  21,42  27,72  28,01  0,55  47,15  18,63  30,65  2,11  123,61  0,49  0,52  0,19  0,28 
1993  29,87  27,61  0,77  73,70  33,20  25,68  0,68  66,05  15,90  18,51  1,89  98,56  0,55  0,53  0,11  0,14 
1994  28,55  24,97  0,41  29,68  36,71  28,56  0,55  57,72  30,92  33,05  0,64  58,38  0,47  0,47  0,15  0,19 
1995  29,27  28,73  0,77  67,38  37,38  34,67  0,56  64,68  49,09  49,90  0,41  61,12  0,48  0,48  0,15  0,21 
1996  30,77  33,15  0,50  38,74  21,72  21,61  0,59  37,76  34,79  39,62  0,46  47,38  0,50  0,50  0,09  0,15 
1997  33,32  33,41  0,32  0,32  28,89  27,31  0,58  0,58  42,92  52,42  0,47  54,82  0,43  0,47  0,22  0,26 
1998  30,87  26,94  0,55  51,31  37,48  41,91  0,51  62,13  46,84  58,97  0,48  56,18  0,41  0,44  0,17  0,19 
1999  17,91  12,94  1,01  51,67  33,32  36,10  0,65  55,50  29,44  16,52  0,95  68,90  0,42  0,43  0,13  0,16 
Source: Own Elaboration. The database managed in this paper is a panel data that includes annual 
observations of 100 Spanish  municipalities with population higher than 50.000 
inhabitants  for the period 1992-1999. T his  supposes to  work with  800 individual 
observations.  The  information  has been  provided by  Subdirección General de 
Coordinación de las Haciendas Locales. It is important to highlight that from liquidated 
expenditures, we have obtained the consolidated values. Finally, personal  net income 
has been obtained from Anuarios Comerciales de España del Servicio de Estudios de La 
Caixa (1999).  
 
It´s important to point out that monetary variables are expressed in constant 
Euros (2001=100). These data, as well as population, are provided by Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística de España  
 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we have chosen a linear 
specification  which i s  presented in expression (1).
1 The explicit formulation of the 
model is the one in expression (2): 
                     [?]         [?]           [+]          [?]            [-]          [+]            [+]               [+]            
 
The expected signs of the coefficients are shown below each correspondent 
variable. With respect to income, it is quite difficult to determine a priori the expected 
sign of its coefficient, given that this variable compounds both elements of fiscal 
capacity and fiscal necessity, as Farnharm (1985) pointed out. Also, some authors think 
that there exits a negative effect, in the sense that lower-income people prefer debt 
financing because they have to pay less taxes in the present-day. On the contrary, 
higher-income people would be in opposition to an expansive debt policy (Adams, 
1977). Nevertheless, these type of arguments are suitable for the USA, but they are not 
appropriate for the Spanish local public sector. The reason has to do with the 
referendum requirement that exists in many local and State governments in USA, whose 
aim is to reconcile voters’ preferences and government’s policy. Other authors like 
Kiewiet and Szakaly (1996) think that income exerts a positive influence on borrowing, 
given the fact that there exists a positive income elasticity for capital goods. Thus, 
                                                 
1 Also, other specifications have been used (multiplicative, exponential, growth models, etc.) not improving the results, so finally 
these partial results have not been included in this paper. 
it it it it t t it it it PD OR OR PA INV AHB TEND CIC GRAN Y DPC _ _ 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 b b b b b b b b b + + + + + + + + =municipalities with a broad proportion of higher-income inhabitants would also 
accumulate a higher amount of debt.                 
 
As we mentioned previously, it is also expected that electoral cycle had a 
positive effect on indebtedness due to the  illusion of the debt and the governments’ 
propensity to borrowing because it is a revenue with reduced political costs (Marlow 
and Joulfaian, 1989; Escudero and Prior, 2003). On the other hand, the expected sign 
for the big cities dummy ( GRAN) is ambiguous. These type of municipalities are 
characterized for a higher demand for public services and, as a consequence, a higher 
expenditure. However, they also receive a great amount of grants from the Central 
government in order to satisfy the sufficiency principle and, as a result, the net effect of 
GRAN on indebtedness is uncertain.  
 
In addition, a higher level of public investments induces a higher amount of 
debt, taking into account the intergenerational equity principle. It is expected that the 
variables that approximate the expenditure deviations with respect the initial budgeted 
values, PA_OR and OR_PD, have a positive relationship with debt levels. Moreover, we 
can expect a negative sign for the coefficient of  AHB, involving a big amount of 
revenues for the local government and, thus, a lower demand for debt financing. Finally, 
we have included a trend,  TEND, in order to capture debt evolution in the period 
analyzed. 
   
Estimates  are shown in Table 4. We present two models, considering two 
different dependent variables. Firstly, we specified  DPC1 as gross indebtness, 
calculated as the revenues obtained by credit resources. But it could be interesting to 
define that variable in net terms, calculating it as the difference between revenues and 
expenditures linked to credits, DPC2. Within-groups and random-effects models have 
been applied and compared.  
 
 
 TABLE 4 
Results: estimates 
WITHIN-GROUPS 
DEP VAR: DPC1  DEP VAR: DPC2 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Err  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Y  ---  ---  ---  --- 
GRAN  ---  ---  ---  --- 
CIC                    -6.3830*  3.2668                    -0.8081*  0.4307 
TEND              -0.9560     0.9129                -1.9539  1.5413 
AHB                -0.1295*  0.0740  -0.1970***  0.0349 
INV  0.2470***  0.0772  0.3365***  0.0364 
PA_OR  183.6210***  29.0775  -34.3137**  13.7193 
OR_PD  108.0772***  22.4850                    3.6415  10.6089 
Constant  -190.2099***  31.1435  34.4613**  14.6941 
 
Breusch-Pagan Test
2 c (1)  31.64***  63.45*** 
Hausman Test
2 c (7)  31.54***  9.59 
 
RANDOM-EFFECTS 
DEP VAR: DPC1  DEP VAR: DPC2 
Variable  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef.  Std. Err. 
Y                  -0.0033**  0.0015               -0.0001  0.0008 
GRAN  24.9723***  9.0197                    9.3057**  4.7304 
CIC              -0.1664  0.8431               -0.6313  0.3969 
TEND                    -7.0858**  3.3156               -2.1090  1.5389 
AHB  -0.1511***  0.0576  -0.1972***  0.0280 
INV  0.2370***  0.0704  0.3301***  0.0334 
PA_OR  79.5763***  23.4698  -57.4447***  11.3576 
OR_PD  89.9159***  17.2879                 1.3510  8.4292 
Constant  -71.1319***  24.5007  54.3452***  12.0644 
*** Significance at 1% level  ** Significance at 5% level  * Significance at 10% level 
 
 
We can notice that GRAN coefficient is significant in one of the models. This 
fact could indicate that there could be differences among big cities and the remaining 
local jurisdictions. At the same time, it is possible to see that the nearest of political 
elections does not condition local debt levels. This fact can be explained because it is 
possible that local governmental instability leads debt to the opposite direction. In that 
context, opposition party could stand budgeting approval, impeding actual government 
to use credits in order to finance its activity. So, we have not found evidence of 
political-electoral cycles.  
 
It is possible to find several significant factors that explain local indebtness. By 
one side, an upper effort in investments leads to municipalities to use credit more 
frequently, because of the intergenerational equity principle. By the other side, gross saving generate lower per head indebtness. It can be noticed that the indebtness levels 
have decreased in time, fact which is reflect in TREND coefficient. In general, the ratios 
PA_OR and OR_PD present the expected sign, in the sense that the gaps which exist 
among different budgeting stages are relevant in order to explain the indebtness levels. 
 
3.  Conclusions 
 
We have analyzed what kind of factors could explain the indebtness level of 
spanish municipalities. We have followed empirical studies developed until nowadays, 
in Spain and other countries. Disaggregated data set of 100 medium-big size spanish 
municipalities for the period 1992-1999 has been used in this study. Different panel data 
models have been compared, including as explanatory variables a group of socio-
economic, political and budgeting factors, which are expected that have influence on 
municipal government indebtness. The results of the empirical exercise have shown that 
local debt is explained by a combination of several factors.  
 
Regarding socio-economic variables, we have found that income level has an 
ambiguous effect, and in the majority of estimations is not significant. With respect to 
political variables, we have not found evidence of electoral cycles. This fact could be 
explained by the instability of local governments, that, sometimes, can lead to credit 
restrictions.  
 
However, we can find that the ability of saving or the investment effort by local 
jurisdiction are important factors which explain frequently the indebtness levels. In this 
sense, the recent Budgetary Stability Law, according with the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact, will have an important influence on public local investments. Finally, we have 
noticed that expenditure deviation from initial budgeting values is another factor to 
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